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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, and STATE OF
UTAH, by and through JOHN W.
ROLLY. Director, Utah State
Trade Commission,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16555
-vsI.M.C. MINT CORPORATION,
ROBERT GRABAR, GEORGE E.
Tl'liBEY, et al. ,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third
District Court wherein the court denied Appellant State Tax
Commission's claim for priority payment of the sales and
withholding tax debts of the defendant, I.M.C. Mint Corporation from the assets marshalled by the Receiver of the estate
and property of said defendant.

The Receiver is the Respondent

on this appeal.
DISPOSI'riON IN LOHER COURT
On March 15, 1979, a hearing was held before the
Honorable James S. Sawaya upon the Receiver's objections to
the priority claims of the Utah State Tax Commission for
certain sales and withholding taxes and penalties in connection therewith.

Memoranda of law were filed by counsel for
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the Receiver and the State Tax Commission.

After due con-

sideration, the district court issued an order sustaining the
Receiver's ObJections to these priority claims, from which
order the Tax Commission now appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third District
Court's determination and a ruling that the state's claims for
sales and withholding taxes be declared superior to those
claims of general, unsecured creditors.

Respondent seeks an

affirmance of the order below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 21, 1974, a receivership was instituted at
the instance of the Consumer Fraud Division of the Utah
Attorney General's office and a Receiver appointed of the
estate and property of I.M.C. Mint Corporation.

(R. 12-13).

Subsequently, the Tax Commission of the State of Utah filed
claims of preferred debt with the Receiver in the amounts of
$12,380.79 for unpaid sales tax (R. 440) and $7,538.22 for
unpaid withholding of income tax (R. 441).
The Receiver filed objections to those claims on the
following basis:
1.

I

II

The claims had no priority over claims of genera:/

creditors except to the extent that lien status was conferr~
by statute upon the tax debts.

-2- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

2.

There was no lien in favor of the Tax Commission

for either unpaid sales taxes or unpaid withholding taxes as
of the date the receivership was instituted, there having been
no warrant for either sales or withholding taxes filed by the
Tax Commission pursuant to Sections 59-15-11 and 59-14-16,
U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
3.

The claim for withholding tax included penalties

in the amount of $1,620.20 and the claim for sales tax ineluded penalties in the amount of $60.00, neither of which
were properly allowable.

(R. 438-41).

A hearing on the obJections of the Receiver was held
before the Honorable James
485-6).

s.

Sawaya on March 15, 1979.

(R.

Arguments were heard and the Judge granted the

request of the tax commission's counsel for leave to file a
written memorandum of law on the issues involved with the
state's claim for priority over general, unsecured creditors.
Memoranda were filed by both parties.

(R. 455-484).

was issued sustaining the Receiver's objections.

An order

(R. 485).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EXISTENCE OF A LIEN IS THE ONLY BASIS
UPON WHICH THE TAX CLAIMS ASSERTED HEREIN
CAN BE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER THE CLAIMS OF
OTHER CREDITORS.
The central issue on this appeal is whether or not a
lien existed in favor of the Tax Commission for unpaid sales
taxes or unpaid withholding taxes and penalties in connection
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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therewith on the date the receivership was instituted even
though warrants had not as yet been filed.

Such a lien must

arise, if at all, pursuant to the statutory provisions conferring lien status on certain tax debts.
In its brief, the Commission argues that tax claims
are inherently superior to other claims, yet the Commission
cites no authority either in the Utah case law or in the Utah
statutes which would suggest that tax claims have some inherent priority over other claims irrespective of any priority
status specifically conferred by statute upon such claims.
In support of its inherent superiority claim, the
Commission cites two decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380 (1920), and Michigan\
Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 (1932).

In each of these

cases the Supreme Court specifically identified the issues
involved as issues of local law· and therefore, deferred to the
local statutory provisions and case law.
Whether the priority enjoyed by the
state of New York is a prerogative right or
merely a rule of adninistration is a matter
of local law. Being such, the decisions of
the highest court of the state as to the
existence of the right and its incidents
will be accepted by this court as conclusive.
Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380 at 384-85
( 1920).
We are not required to choose from
these diversities the construction that
-4-
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would appeal to us as the most consonant
with reason if choice were wholly free.
Choice, as it happens, is not free, for our
task is to ascertain the meaning of a
Michigan statute, and as to that the courts
of the State, if they have spoken, pronounce
the final word. Michigan v. Michigan Trust
Co., 286 u.s. 334 at 342 (1932).
The local law to which Appellant refers, however,
lends no support to Appellant's argument and provides no
guidance to this Court in determining the issues at hand.

The

cases of Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d 400 (1935),
affir~ed

in Ingraham v. Hanson, 297 U.S. 378 (1936), Robinson v.

Hanson, 75 Utah 30, 282 P. 782 (1929), and Union Cent. Life
Ins. Co. v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486 (1926) cited in
Appellant's brief do not address the issue of when a lien
based upon unpaid taxes arises, which is the central issue of
this appeal, but rather address the priority among admittedly
existing liens.
The only decision of the Utah Supreme Court cited by
Appellant which addresses the issue herein is Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22 Utah 2d 177, 450 P.2d 100 (1969),
which decision Appellant argues should be overruled.

(Brief

of Appellant p.2l).
It should be noted that the case of Michigan v.
Michigan Trust Co., supra, cited on pages 5 and 18 of Appellant's

-5-
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brief addressed an issue which is different and distinct from
the issue under discussion herein.

In Michigan a

receiversh~

was establisned to continue the corporate business rather than
to aid in the dissolution of the corporation and the liquidation of its business, which is the purpose of the I.M.C. Mint
Corporation's receivership.

In that context, the Court found

that franchise taxes accruing for the most part during the
pendency of the receivership, constituted a necessary cost of
continuing the business and thus was an expense of the receivership having priority over other debts.
Distinctions have been drawn between
receivers appointed to carry on the
business of a corporation with a view to
the continuance of its corporate life,
and receivers appointed in aid of the
dissolution of the corporation or the
liquidation of its business.

*

*

*

*

Viewing the receivership in its
true light as one, not to wind up the
corporation, but to foster the assets,
we think the annual taxes accruing while
the receiver was in charge must be
deemed expenses of administration and
therefore charges to be satisfied in
preference to the claims of general
creditors. They are so treated in the
order by which the receiver was appointed.
By the order the receiver is
directed in continuing the business to
pay taxes and rentals and any other
expenses necessary to enable the business to go on, and to give such payments
priority over other debts and obligations.
These privilege fees were
charges of the nature there described.
Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S.
334 at 341-44 (1932).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Similarly in Coy v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 212
F. 520 (D.Ct. Oregon 1914) aff'd 220 F. 90 (9th Cir. 1915),
which is relied on and cited by the court in Michigan, the
court addressed the issue of the receiver's obligation to pay
pers.onal property taxes assessed and accrued during the pendency of the receivership.

In holding that the receiver had a

duty to pay such taxes prior to the payment of other claims
the Ninth Circuit in Coy relied on various treatises on
receivers, one of which stated:
Taxes levied upon personal property in
the hands of a receiver become a
charge upon the estate, and are
properly payable by the receiver as a
part of the costs and expenses of the
administration of the trust. High on
Receivers, §88la (4th Ed.) as quoted
in Coy v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
220 F. 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1915).
It is a well established rule that costs and expenses
of a receivership constitute a first charge against the property
or funds in receivership.

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers §280 at 98.

The payment of taxes accruing during the pendency of the receivership and other costs or expenses of administration of the
receivership is a separate and distinct issue from that of the
priority of taxes such as those at issue herein which accrued
prior to the institution of receivership proceedings and which
cannot be categorized as an administration expense.
Thus, the cases cited by the Appellant in its first
point of argument are inapplicable and afford the court no
assistance or guidance in the determination of the issue at hand.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated -7OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THE ACCRUAL OF SALES AND WITHHOLDING TAXES
ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A LIEN
AGAINST THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF I.M.C. MINT
CORPORATION WITHOUT THE FILING OF A WARRANT.
As conceded by the Commission, the sales and withholding taxes upon which this controversy are based, accrued
prior to the appointment of the Receiver, but no warrant based
thereon was filed or docketed prior to the institution of the
receivership.
Rule 66(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires a receiver to discharge all taxes constituting a lien
on personal property held by the receiver before such property
can be sold or transferred:
Payment of Taxes Before Sale or Hypothecation
of Personal Property. Before any personal
property corning into the hands of a receiver
may be sold, transferred or hypothecated,
such receiver shall pay and discharge any
and all taxes constituting a lien thereon,
legally levied by any taxing unit of the
state, and shall file with the court having
jurisdiction of such receivership, receipts
or other competent evidence showing the
full payment and discharge of any and all
such taxes, provided, that in a case where
no sufficient liquid assets are at the time
of the proposed sale, transfer or hypothecation, in the hands of such receiver, the
court having jurisdiction of such receivership
may authorize such sale, transfer or hypothecation to be made prior to the payment
and discharge of such taxes, but immediately

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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upon receipt of the consideration for such sale,
transfer or hypothecation such receiver
shall pay and discharge all such liens,
taxes, and within 10 days thereafter shall
file with the court receipts of other
competent evidence showing the full payment
and discharge of all such taxes.
(Emphasis
added).
The pivotal issue is obviously whether or not the tax claims
asserted herein by the commission constitute a lien on the
personal property held in receivership.
The Commission argues that the mere accrual of the
tax constitutes a lien irrespective of whether or not a
warrant has been filed, citing Section 59-14A-44(e) as establishing a lien to secure the payment of withholding taxes
and Section 59-15-10 as establishing a lien for sales tax.

l/

Although these sections appear on their face to establish
liens for sales and withholding taxes, they must be read in
the light of subsequent sections in the sales and withholding
tax chapters which provide for the issuance of warrants.

It should be noted that §59-15-10 only applies to a " • • •
proprietor who shall sell out his business or stock of goods
or shall guit business." Whether or not an involuntary
receivership constitutes a selling out or a quitting of
business is highly questionable.
It is, however, an issue
which is not specifically addressed because no lien exists, in
any event, without the filing of a warrant.

-9-
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Section 59-14A-79(c-e) of the Utah Code Annotated
provides as follows:
(c) If any person liable under this act for
the payment of any tax, addition to tax,
penalty or interest neglects or refuses to
pay the same within ten days after notice
and demand for payment has been given to
such person under subsection (b) of this
section, the tax commission may issue a
warrant in duplicate under its official
seal directed to the sheriff of any county
of the state commanding him to levy upon
and sell such person's real and personal
property for the payment of the amount
assessed, plus the cost of executing the
warrant, and to return such warrant to the
tax commission and pay to it the money
collected by virtue thereof within sixty
days after the receipt of the warrant.
If
the tax commission finds that the collection of the tax or other amount is in
jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate
payment of such tax may be made by the tax
commission and upon failure or refusal to
pay such tax or other amount the tax
commission may issue a warrant without
regard to the ten-day period provided in
this subsection. See section 59-14A-91 for
provisions relating to Jeopardy assessment
procedure.
(d) Any sheriff who receives a warrant
under subsection (c) of this section shall
within five days thereafter file the
duplicate copy with the clerk of the
district court of the appropriate county.
The clerk of such court shall thereupon
enter in the judgment docket, in the
column for JUdgment debtors, the name of
the taxpayer mentioned in the warrant and,
in appro8riate columns, the tax or other
amounts for 11hich the warrant is issued and
the date when such copy is filed; and such
amount shall thereupon be a bin~lien
upon the real, personal and other pr~erty
of the taxpayer to the same extent as other
judgments duly docketed in the office of
such clerk.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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(e) When a warrant has been filed with the
county clerk, the tax commission shall, in
the right of the people of the State of
Utah, be deemed to have obtained judgment
against the taxpayer for the tax or other
amounts.
Nearly identical language is found in Section 59-15-11 of the
Utah Code Annotated in relation to sales tax.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22 Utah 2d 177,
450 P.2d 100 (1969) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted language
identical to the withholding tax provisions cited above and
held:
• . . that the lien of a state for
delinquent withholding taxes begins to
run at the time notice thereof is given
by filing the warrant.
450 P.2d at
102.
The Receiver submits that the Phillips case mandates
the conclusion that the tax claims asserted herein did not
constitute liens until warrants were filed.

Inasmuch as the

warrants were not filed at the institution of the receivership,
no lien existed and therefore the tax claims have no priority.
The Commission attempts to avoid the effect of the
clear holding in the Phillips case by arguing first that other
JUrisdictions have arrived at different interpretations of
similar statutory language; second, that the interpretation in
Phillips is somehow discredited by the legislative reenactment
of language identLcal to the language interpreted in Phillips;
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third, that Phillips is distinguishable from the present case;
and fourth, that Phillips should be overruled.
Generally, reference to the decisions of other

juri~

dictions is only justified where there is no controlling authority in the court's own jurisdiction.

Even assuming that

such reference is justified in this case despite the Phillips
opinion, the interpretations of statutory provisions relatingto
the creation of tax liens by courts in other jurisdictions are

I

only relevant to the extent that the statutory provisions of

I

those jurisdictions resemble the Utah statutes.
The Commission cites District of Columbia v. Hechinge:'
Properties Co., 197 A. 2d 157 (D. C. Ct. App. 1964) for the
proposition that the existence of a tax lien for delinquent
taxes does not depend upon the filing of a warrant.

The Com-

mission points out the similarities between the Utah Statutes
and the statutes of the District of Columbia but fails to
the differences.
the question

no~~

These differences are in fact determinative[

~1hether

or not tax claims have priority as to

property in the hands of a receiver.

I

There was no recei vershipl

pending in the Hechinger case and therefore, the case is factually dissimilar to the present case.

If a receivership had

been pending in that case as is pending in the present case, ~

-12-
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1

statutes of the District of Columbia specifically provide that
all taxes due and payable shall be paid by the receiver before
any payment is made to other claimants.
The District of Columbia statute reads as follows:
Whenever the business or property of
any person subject to tax under the
terms of this chapter, shall be placed
in receivership or bankruptcy, or
assigrunent is made for the benefit of
creditors, or if said property is
seized under distraint for property
taxes, all taxes, penalties, and
interest imposed by this chapter for
\lhich said person is in any way liable
shall be a prior and preferred claim.
Neither the United States marshal,
nor a receiver, assignee, or any
other officer shall sell the property
of any person subject to tax under
the terms of this chapter under process or order of any court without
first determining from the Collector
the amount of any such taxes due
and payable by said person, and if
there be any such taxes due, mdng,
or unpaid under this chapter, it shall
be the duty of such officer to first
pay to the Collector the amount of
said sale before making any payment
of any moneys to any judgment creditor
or other claimants of whatsoever
kind or nature. * * * (Emphasis
added).
D. C. Code <-74-2609 as cited
in District of ColuG ia v. Hechinger
Properties Co., 197 A.2d 157, 159 fn. 5
(D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
Under the District of Columbia statute, tax claims
would have priority under the circumstances existing in the
-13-
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present case irrespective of whether or not they constitute
liens.

I

These statutes should be contrasted with the Utah Rule

66(f) which requires the receiver to discharge only those taxes[
which constitute a lien on the property held by the receiver
before paying other claims.
Utah has no provisions similar to those of the Distri
of Columbia, dealing with the priority tax claims in receiver·
ship.

The only Utah statutes which confer any priority status

on tax claims are those cited above which have been interpretec
by the Utah Supreme Court as conferring a lien only after the
filing of a warrant.
Also, the District of Columbia statutes

specifical~

provide that the 1 ien for unpaid withholding taxes ".
accrue on the date that the amounts were withheld."
1961, §47-15869(f) (2).

• . shaL
D.C. Codel

In contrast, Utah Code Annotated,

I

Section 59-14A-44(e) which establishes a lien for withheld
taxes, does not specify an accrual date.
The Commission argues on page 15 of its brief thatt
enactment in 1973 of Sections in Chapter l4A using the same
language as the parallel provisions on tax liens and warranUChapter 14 somehow discredits the Phillips decision as a corn
interpretation of the legislative intent.

Actually, tne fact

that the legislature did not change the language in light of L
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Phillips decision would indicate that the legislature acquiesced
in the interpretation of that language by the Utah Supreme
Court.
A further indication of the legislative acquiescence
in this Court's interpretation of the language of the statute as
then constituted, is the apparent recognition by the legislature, subsequent to the Phillips decision, of the need for a
specific provision indicating the date a tax lien accrues or
arises.

In the 1979 General Session, the Utah Legislature

adopted and the Governor has subsequently signed House Bill No.
308 which added the following provision to Section 59-10-22 of
the Utah Code Annotated:
2.
If any person liable to pay the
Utah sales and withholding tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount, including any interest, additional
amount, addition to tax, or assessable
penalty, together with any costs that may
accrue in addition thereto, shall be a
lien in favor of the State of Utah upon
all property and rights to property,
whether real or personal, belonging to
such person.
3.
Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imoosed
for state taxes shall arise at the time
the assessment is made and shall continue
until the liability for the amount so
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assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such liability) is
satisfied or becomes unenforceable by
reason of lapse of time.
This amendment resolves controversies such as this
one as to the accrual date of a tax lien in the future and
thus the dire consequences of Phillips decision forecast by
the Commission on page 20 of its Brief \<lill not come to pass.
However, the Phillips decision still controls controversies
such as the present one arising under the prior statutes which
do not specify an accrual date other than the date of the
filing of a warrant.
Similarly unpersuasive, is the Commission's assertio:
that the Phillips case is distinguishable from the present
case and therefore the Phillips opinion is inapplicable.

The

Commission attempts to distinguish the Phillips case on the
basis that a mortgagee relies on the public record to indicah\
clear title, whereas general creditors do not rely on public '
records in extending credit.

The assumption that general

creditors extend credit without checking public records is nm
a reasonable assumption.

It is not reasonable to assume that

a general creditor of I.M.C. Mint Corporation would extend u
much as $385,000, as one creditor has done, without thorou~~
investigating that company's financial responsibility through
the public records in the Secretary of State's office and the
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county Clerk's office.

General creditors are entitled to rely

on these records to the same extent as secured creditors.
If liens are permitted to arise and exist without
any reflection thereof in the public record, it would impair
the practice of extending credit by general creditors just as
seriously as it would impair the extension of credit by
secured creditors.
In Phillips, this Court based its holding that a
lien arises only upon the filing of a warrant on the following
consideration:
the only record as to delinquent
withholding taxes rests wholly within
the knowledge of the employer until
such time as the Tax Commission makes
its determination as to the amount due
and delinquent and files its warrant
with the appropriate county clerk.
450
P.2d at 102.
The concern evidenced by this Court over the existence
of secret liens is applicable to all forms of extension of
credit.

This concern is reflected in the legislative policy

embraced by the filing provisions of Article Nine of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code.
The argument that the Phillips case should be overruled requires little comment.

The Commission asserts that this

Court ignored the plain language of the statute.

In fact, this

Court, faced with a split of opinion among district courts, gave
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careful consideration to the interrelation of the statutory
provisions relating to liens and warrants.

This Court inter-

preted that statutory language to provide that a lien does not
arise without the filing of a warrant.

The legislature has

apparently acquiesced in that interpretation and found it
necessary to amend the statutes in order to provide for the
accrual of a lien prior to the filing of a warrant.

If the

legislature intended under the prior statute to provide for the I
accrual of a lien prior to the filing of a warrant, the
lature did not accomplish that purpose.

legi~

Court!

In Phillips, this

was bound to interpret the statute as it then read.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF CLAIMS BY THE TAX
COHMISSION FuR PENALTIES AND EXCESS INTEREST
SHOULD BE UPHELD.
The Tax Commission asserted in the court below that
interest, penalties and costs for a receiver's nonpayment of
taxes accruing during the receivership constitute a lien on
the property and are payable by the Receiver.

Thtl

( R • 4 6 8- 9 ) •

assertion and the citations thereto, apply only to penalties
and interest relating to taxes which accrued during the
receivership and are inapplicable to penalties and interest oo
taxes accruing prior to the receivership.

This distinction

has been discussed previously in Point I of this Brief.
Commission has cited no authority which imposes a duty on
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I

The
~e

Receiver to pay penalties and interest on taxes which accrued
prior to the appointment of a receiver.
A receivership proceeding, like a bankruptcy proceeding is equitable in nature, and thus the court has considerable discretion in determining the equities of various
charges and claims.

In bankruptcy, no penalties or excessive

interest for the nonpayment of taxes are allowed as against
the funds held by the trustee

l/

nor is interest allowed after

the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed.

ll

In the

context of a receivership, as in the context of bankruptcy,
tne assessment of penalties and excess interest against funds
held by the receiver has no impact on the entity which failed
to pay the taxes but rather has the effect of penalizing the
creditors of that entity.
penalties is lost.

Thus, the punitive effect of such

Accordingly, the trial court exercised its

eyuitable discretion and denied penalties and excessive
interest.

This Court should uphold that exercise of dis-

cretion.

~I

11 O.S.C.A. §93(j); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy,
at p. 391-2.

3A Collier on Bankruptcy,

~63.16

~57.22

[2.1]

[2] at p. 1864-70.
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The case of Ralph Child Construction Co. v. State
Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961) illustrates
in another context this policy that penalties should not be
assessed against persons other than the wrongdoer.

Not only

I

are pre-receivership penalties inappropriate and inequitable,

I

but post-receivership penalties attributable to pre-filing
taxes are particularly inappropriate.

It would be intolerable

for a court-appointed officer to scrutinize, challenge and
disallow a tax claim at the peril of paying penalties if he

~

I

I
rl

in error or if there should be inadequate funds in the receiver·,
ship to pay the claim if uncontested.

This is dramatized even

more in this case where the tax claims have no priority over
other claims and could not be paid until such time as the Tax
Commission's proportionate interest in the subject funds could (

I
be determined and satisfied.

)

CONCLUSION
The existence of a lien is the only basis upon

I
t~ I

whi~

the tax claims asserted herein can be given priority over

:::i::xo:l::::rh:::d::::s~nt:::r:::: ::a::::sc::::s::gr:~ens ~
quiring the filing of a warrant before such liens arise.
warrants were filed with respect to those claims asserted

-20-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No

·

,
herein by the Tax Commission prior to the appointment of the
Receiver.

Thus, no liens as to those tax claims existed and

therefore, those tax claims have no priority.
Therefore, the determination of the District Court
that these tax claims have no priority was a correct application of the relevant statutes and case law, as was its denial
of the Tax Commission's claim for penalties, and for interest
accruing subsequent to the institution of the receivership and
such determination should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

of October,

1979.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
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